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This paper develops a model in which colleges seek to maximize the quality of the educa-
tional experience provided to their students. We deduce predictions about the hierarchy of
schools that emerges in equilibrium, the allocation of students by income and ability among
schools, and about the pricing policies that schools adopt. The empirical ndings of this
paper suggest that there is a hierarchy of school qualities which is characterized by substan-
tial stratication by income and ability. The evidence on pricing by ability is supportive of
positive peer eects in educational achievement from high ability at the college level.
Keywords: higher education, peer eects, school competition, non-linear pricing.
JEL classication: I21, C33, D581 Introduction
It is easy to think of many ways in which peer student quality might be important in
educational settings. A student surrounded by able and motivated peers may benet from
higher quality in-class discussions, help outside of class in understanding dicult material,
stimulating bull sessions, role models that encourage conscientious completion of homework
assignments, and competition that fosters thorough preparation for examinations. More
able and motivated students might also increase productivity of teachers. While it is quite
plausible that such peer eects are present, it is not an easy matter to measure them.
Fortunately, however, peer eects in education can be expected to have measurable eects
on market outcomes. Our goals in this paper are to develop predictions regarding market
consequences of peer eects in education and to oer empirical evidence about the extent
to which those predictions are borne out in the data.
If peer quality does, in fact, provide educational benets, then students and their par-
ents can be expected to seek out schools where the student body oers high quality peers.
Likewise, schools that wish to be ranked highly will attempt to attract students who con-
tribute to improving peer quality. In higher education, schools have the latitude to choose
price and admission policies to attempt to attract a high quality student body. We present a
model in which schools seek to maximize the quality of the educational experience provided
to their students. The quality of the educational experience depends on peer ability of the
student body and on instructional expenditures per student. From this model we deduce
predictions about the hierarchy of schools that emerges in equilibrium, the allocation of
1students by income and ability among schools, and about the pricing policies that schools
adopt. These predictions are the subject of our empirical investigation.
Related research has investigated normative and positive consequences of competition in
primary and secondary education, and the likely eects of policy changes including vouchers,
public school choice, and changes in education nancing.1 Related research on higher edu-
cation has investigated the payos associated with higher education (see Dale and Krueger
(1998) and references therein), coordinated behavior (Carlton, Bamberger, and Epstein,
1995; Netz, 1998), market evolution (Goldin and L. Katz, 1998); market structure and tu-
ition (Hoxby, 1997, 1999), and pricing, peer eects, and eciency (Rothschild and White,
1995). The works by Hoxby (1997), Rothschild and White (1995), and Epple and Romano
(1998, 1999, 2000) are closest in spirit to this research. Hoxby (1997) considers the eects of
changing market structure of higher education on tuition over the period from 1940 to 1991.
Hoxby (1999) continues the investigation of market structure, with emphasis on the way in
which pricing by selective colleges and universities changed in response to antitrust action
brought against private colleges for price xing. We consider pricing and selection among
colleges and universities throughout the school hierarchy with an emphasis on investigating
the implications of our model of school competition and pricing.
Our work shares with Rothschild and White an interest in pricing in the presence of peer
eects. Our work diers in its: consideration of students dierentiated by both ability and
1See among others, Arnott and Rowse (1987), Bergstrom, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1982), Caucutt (1998),
deBartolome (1990), Epple and Romano (1998, 1999, 2000), Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1998), Fernandez
and Rogerson (1996, 1998), Fuller, Manski, and Wise (1982), Glomm and Ravikumar (1992), Hanushek,
Kain, Markman, and Rivkin (2000), Hoxby (1996), Manski (1991), Nechyba (1998, 1999, 2000), Toma
(1996), Venti and Wise (1982), and Zimmer and Toma (1998).
2household income, focus on the implications of quality maximization, development of im-
plications for allocation of students by ability and income across colleges, and development
of implications about the ordering of endowments, inputs, student ability, and household
income across colleges. The most signicant dierences from Epple and Romano's (1995,
1998, 1999) work on primary and secondary education are the alternative objectives of
quality rather than prot maximization, the introduction of endowments, and the empirical
analysis of colleges and universities
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the equilibrium model
and relates a number of results which characterize allocations in equilibrium. Section 3
discusses our data sources and provides some descriptive statistics of our sample. Sections
4 and 5 present the main empirical nding of this study. Section 6 concludes the analysis.
2 A Theoretical Model of Higher Education
In this section, we sketch our theoretical model of provision of undergraduate education.
The model is developed in more detail in Epple, Romano, and Sieg (1999) where proofs of
the results are provided.
2.1 Preferences and Technologies
There is a continuum of students who dier with respect to their income, y, and their ability







 > 0 (1)
where j is the peer-student measure, equal to mean ability level in the student body, and
Ij is the expenditure per student in excess of custodial costs. The schooling cost function
is
C(kj;Ij) = F + V (kj) + kj Ij V 0;V 00 > 0 (2)
where kj is the size of the school j's student body. In the empirical implementation of
the model we assume that variable custodial costs are quadratic in kj, i.e. V (kj) =
V1 kj + V2 k2
j.
We assume that the decision to attend college is made by the student's household.
Household utility from attendance at school j is given by:
U(y   pj;a(qj;bj)) = (y   pj) aj (3)
where aj = qjb is achievement of the household's student and pj is tuition. Below we
introduce non-school nancial aid into the analysis. A choice of not attending school is
equivalent to q being equal to a given low value q0, and with p = 0. The joint distribution
of income and ability is continuous with joint density f(b;y).
Schools are assumed to maximize their quality. They must satisfy a prot constraint,
4with revenue equal to the sum of all tuition from students and earnings on exogenous endow-
ment. Denote the latter earnings Rj. Rj also includes any other non-tuition revenues like
state subsidies. While schools will condition tuition on student characteristics, we presume
that school j charges a maximum tuition denoted pm
j . We do not have an explicit theory
to explain or determine the magnitude of pm
j so we treat it as exogenous. Our motivation
for introducing price caps is empirical. We interpret the price maximum as the school's
marketed tuition, with lower tuition framed as nancial aide, a scholarship, or, perhaps,
a fellowship. Having a price cap below the maximum tuition chosen by an unconstrained
quality maximizer might help a school market itself. We have assumed, however, that
households observe all prices relevant to them, so our argument for price caps is somewhat
incomplete. One can also conceive of the self-imposed price cap as re
ecting some limit on
revenue making, whether motivated by altruism or, again, related to marketing. One can
also link the price cap to a school's cost as further discussed below. While treating the
price caps as exogenous is not ideal, it is comforting that they lead to empirically realistic
predictions as we will see.
2.2 School Optimization
Schools take types' (b;y) utilities as given. School j's optimization problem may be written:










j b = Ua(b;y) 8 (b;y) (5)
pj(y;b) = minfpm
j ;pr
j(b;y)g 8 (b;y) (6)
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b j(y;b) f(y;b) dy db (10)
where here and henceforth integrals are over the support of (b;y) unless otherwise indicated.
In (5), Ua(b;y) is the maximum alternative utility available to type (b;y) in equilibrium,
and thus pr
j(b;y) is type (b;y)'s reservation price for attending school j.2 In expressions (6)
and (7) we have built into the problem the obvious result that all types who attend school
j will pay the minimum of their reservation price or the tuition cap. The function j(y;b)
is an admission function that indicates the proportion of type (b;y) that school j admits.
The upper bound of 1 on j(b;y) requires that schools can admit no more of a type than
exists.3 In equilibrium, admission sets and attendance sets will coincide. The constraints
(9) and (10) dene kj, school size, and j, the peer group measure, respectively.






































2Note that the reservation price depends on qj, but we use the more compact notation subscripting the
function with j.
3Hence it is innocuous to have specied that (6) holds for all students, i.e. , including those that will not
be admitted.
4See Epple et al. (1999) for details.
6where
EMCj = V 0(kj) + Ij +
@qj=@
@qj=@I
(j   b) (12)
Equation (12) denes the \eective marginal costs (EMC)" of admitting a student of ability
b to school j. EMC is the sum of the marginal resource cost of educating the student and the
cost of maintaining quality due to the student's impact on the peer group. The latter eect
is captured by the last term in (12), which equals the peer measure change from admitting
a student of ability b, multiplied by the expenditure change that maintains quality. Note
that this term is negative for students with ability above the school's mean, and EMCj itself
can be negative. Students whose maximum feasible tuition exceeds EMCj permit quality
increases and are all admitted, and the reverse for students who cannot be charged a tuition





> > > <
> > > :





j = f(b;y) j r
j(b;y) > 0g denote the set of students that attend school j
and pay their reservation price, and Am
j = f(b;y) j j(b;y) 0 and (b;y) = 2 Ar
jg denote
the remaining students that attend j. Let Aj = Ar
j [ Am
j denote school j's admission and
attendance sets of student types.5
5The market-clearing condition presented below can be used to show that schools' attendance sets do not
overlap with positive measure in the support of (b;y).
72.3 Properties of Market Equilibrium
In market equilibrium, households choose among the J schools or choose no school, taking
school qualities and tuition and admission policies as given. The J schools choose admission
and tuition policies to maximize quality, taking as given their endowment and students'
alternative utility possibilities.6 The model is closed with the market clearing condition:
PJ
j=1 j(b;y)  1 8 (b;y), where types for whom the inequality is strict are attending no
school.
We now describe key properties of equilibrium.7 One assumption we place on price caps
is that schools of equal quality have the same price caps:
Assumption 1 qi = qj ) pm
i = pm
j
With this assumption, we have proved the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Strict Hierarchy:
Equilibrium has a strict hierarchy of schools: q1 < q2 < ::: < qJ 1 < qJ, that follows the
endowment hierarchy: R1 < R2 < ::: < RJ 1 < RJ.
Proof: See Epple et al. (1999).
6The maximum alternative utility is computed using Lemma 1 below. The assumption of utility taking
is a generalization of price taking that has been utilized in the competitive club goods literature. See, for
example, Gilles and Scotchmer (1997).
7We have not developed a general existence proof, but we have shown existence in some examples. Here
we assume existence and focus on necessary properties of equilibrium.
Using (7) and (11), one can show that schools will be below the scale that minimizes average cost and
that it is likely schools with higher endowment will be smaller. These results depend, however, on our
presumption that schools have the same cost function., in particular, the same \ecient scale." Because the
latter assumption is made for convenience and is not realistic, we do not take seriously the size predictions.
hence we make no attempts to explain size empirically.
8The intuition of the strict hierarchy traces to increased willingness of households to
pay for quality as income rises. If equivalent quality schools were to exist, then either
school could engineer a quality increase by reformulating the school with student body
consisting of relatively higher income and higher ability types from the two schools' initial
student bodies. Not only could this be done while maintaining budget balance, but, because
the school would be richer and have better peer group, tuition could be set to relax the
prot constraint. This would allow quality increases beyond the improved peer group by
increasing expenditures on educational inputs. The implied quality hierarchy must follow
the endowment hierarchy. All schools maximize quality and better endowed ones can spend
more on inputs and can give steeper discounts to higher ability students.8
School j's price cap implies a minimum ability necessary for admission to j, i.e., regardless
of a type's income and reservation price. Using (6), (11) and that EMCj is decreasing in
b, quality maximization dictates that b  bm
j is necessary for admission, where pm
j =
EMCj(bm
j ) denes bm

















In most cases, j and Ij will rise with qj as discussed below. It is then likely that bm
j will
increase with school quality. For example, a plausible approximation is that pm
j is a xed
8Another result is that quality maximization leads schools to spend more than Pareto ecient amounts
on inputs. Schools can get away with this because their equilibrium dierentiation leads them to have some
market power.
9mark up over the marginal resource cost of educating a student, i.e., pm
j = M (Ij + V 0)
with M > 1.9 Then, from (14), bm
j is an increasing function of j and Ij. It facilitates the
analysis to simply assume:
Assumption 2 bm
1 < bm
2 < ::: < bm
J 1 < bm
J
Assumption 2 will allow us to show equilibrium is characterized by stratication by income
and ability across the school hierarchy. Two lemmas useful for this are presented next.
Lemma 1 Among the set of schools S(b) for which a student (b;y) qualies, S(b) = fj j b 
bm
j g, equilibrium school attendance conforms to that if schools in S(b) set tuition equal to
EMCj(b).
Proof: See Epple et al. (1999).
Lemma 1 essentially follows from the admission condition (11). Since any school wants
a student who is willing to pay their EMC, equilibrium (i.e. market clearing) requires that
students have access to schools that they do not attend at EMC. The school j that the
student attends may set tuition exceeding EMCj as discussed below, but this is due to
strict preference if pj = EMCj for school j. Perhaps clearer intuition is that the price
discrimination over income that occurs in equilibrium is \perfect" or of the \rst degree,"
hence the allocation is consistent with social marginal cost pricing (income eects aside).
For part of Lemma 2 below, it is convenient to assume that the coecients on (j   b)
9We still do not, however, let schools optimize over p
m
j .
10in EMCj (see (12)) weakly ascend along the school hierarchy. This may be written:
Assumption 3 I1
1 < I2
2 < :::: < IJ
J
While Assumption 3 is not immediately intuitive, there are several ways it can be de-
fended. One interpretation is that the assumption implies that student expenditure rises
more quickly than the quality of the peer group as one moves up the hierarchy. The lat-
ter is consistent with the data using conventional measures of peer quality (i.e. average
SAT scores). As will be evident in several tables presented in Section 3 below, per student
expenditure rises more rapidly than mean SAT as one moves up the hierarchy of schools.
A theoretical interpretation of Assumption 3 that one can glean from the expression for
EMC is that it conforms to a rising marginal value of peer group improvements along the
school hierarchy. Not only is this intuitive, but we have consistently found this in related
computational analysis of equilibria. Last, we will see in the Proof of Lemma 2 (that we
then retain) that the Assumption is much stronger than needed for the theoretical results.
Lemma 2 Let S(b) denote the set of schools for which student of ability b qualies, S(b) =
fj jb  bm
j g. Let P(S0) denote a set of students who qualify for the same set of schools,
P = f(b;y) jS(b) = S0g. (Note that (A2) implies P contains all types with b 2 [bm
j ;bm
j+1)
for some j 2 1;::;J   1 and that there are J sets P(S0).) P is characterized by income and
ability stratication across S0.10
Proof:
10By income stratication we mean that, for any xed b; y2 > y1 implies the school (b;y2) attends is
of weakly higher quality than the school type (b;y1) attends, and strictly if dierent schools are attended.
Ability stratication is dened analogously for xed y.
11By Lemma 1, the partition of P into schools is as though pj = EMCj for all j 2 S0.
Let Uj = (y   EMCj(b)) qjb denote utility from attending school j under EMC pricing.
Consider any schools j and i in S0 such that qj > qi. Then:
@(Uj   Ui)
@y
= (qj   qi) b > 0 (15)






(Uj   Ui) + (j qj   iqi) b (16)
where j = (@qj=@j) = (@qj=@Ij). Using (A3), for b1 such that Uj > Ui, it follows that
Uj > Ui for all b > b1. This implies ability stratication. Q.E.D.
We can now establish two key properties of equilibrium allocations:
Proposition 2 Stratication by Income and Ability: The equilibrium allocation is charac-
terized by income and ability stratication across the hierarchy of schools.
Proof: See Epple et al. (1999).
Figure 1 depicts an equilibrium allocation in a case with three schools. The solid lines are
boundary loci separating student bodies (which never meet in this example). The lower,
downward-sloping segments of the boundary loci are indierence loci between adjacent
schools under EMC pricing (as justied below). The vertical portions follow the ability
12minima in each school. The dashed lines demarcate the subsets of each school's student
body that pay the price cap or their (lower) reservation price.
Insert FIGURE 1 here
Proposition 3 reports central properties of the equilibrium tuition structure.
Proposition 3 Along boundary loci, tuition at the school attended (either adjacent school)
equals EMC and thus depends only on ability. In the interior of admission sets, tuition
at the school attended exceeds EMC, and depends then in part on the student's household
income. In any school, for given income, tuition decreases weakly in ability and strictly if
the student does not pay his school's price maximum and has another school (rather than
no college) as his best alternative.
Proof: See Epple et al. (1999).
Insert FIGURE 2 here
Figure 2 provides additional information relevant to the determination of prices for
the equilibrium in Figure 1. Here the downward sloping portions of the dashed lines are
indierence loci for the alternative schools under EMC pricing by a corollary to Lemma 1.
The numbers within the admission spaces indicate the student's best alternative choice of
school (or 0 for no college). One can employ stratication implications of preferences and
Lemma 1 to establish the latter properties of the equilibrium partition. Take the subset of
students with b  bm
3 , for example. They face no restriction on school attended and prices
13at alternative schools equal EMC. It is straightforward to establish in a case like that in
Figures 1-2 that those who attend school 3 all have school 2 as their best alternative. Then
using (3) and (6), one can compute the dashed boundary in Figure 1 that separates students
in school 3 who pay the price cap from those who pay the reservation price. The equation











q3 q2. Those in Am
3 pay tuition of pm
3 and those in Ar
3 pay pr
3 which is easily





q3 EMC2(b). Those who qualify for school 3 but choose
school 2 have school 1 or school 3 as their best alternative. Use the latter to determine
their equilibrium price. Then proceed recursively by considering the set of types who qualify
for all schools but 3.11 And so on.
The model's central predictions for pricing can be summarized as follows.
P1 Relatively higher income and lower ability types in any school (i.e., students in Am
j )
will pay the school's maximum tuition.
P2 Among those students not paying the maximum tuition (i.e., students in Ar
j), tuition
will decline with ability.12
P3 Among those students not paying the maximum tuition, tuition's dependence on
11Price will decline discretely within school 2 as b rises above b
m
3 for those students who then have school
3 as their strictly preferred best alternative.
12An exception is students in A
r
1 (in the lowest quality school) who have no college as their best alternative.
Their tuition does not decline with ability because their competing alternative of no college does not discount
to ability.
14household income will be relatively weak except in the top schools where tuition will rise
with income.
Prediction (P1) is an obvious consequence of the model. Prediction (P2), from Propo-
sition 3, is due to competition for ability. More specically, access to competing schools
at EMC, which declines with ability, requires that the school increase nancial aid with
ability. Prediction (P3) is more subtle. In Ar
j, tuition equals pr
j(b;y), and the issue is how
it depends on y. Consider Figure 2 and students in any other school than 3, say school 2.
Fix the student's ability slightly () above bm
3 and ask how pr
2(bm
3 + ;y) varies as income
rises from its minimum. So long as school 1 is the student's best alternative, then pr
2 in-
creases with income. But when income reaches the point such that school 3 becomes the
best alternative, then pr
2 decreases with income, because the relative preference for higher
school quality increases with income. In short, competition for students from \both sides"
curtails the scope for discrimination over income. The highest quality school is exceptional
because there is no competition for students \from the top". Within Ar
J, tuition rises with
income.
To the extent that quality dierentiation among schools that compete for students is
minimal, as if there are many small colleges in an educational market, tuition cannot dier
much from eective marginal cost. If on the other hand, a set of top schools essentially
act as one leading school (among which students then are largely indierent), the model
predicts substantial income discrimination within this set of schools. It is no secret that
an active cartel of elite private schools existed, although the consequences of their collusion
15is more controversial.13 More generally, the extent to which markets for higher education
are relatively insulated, e.g., regional, will permit relatively more income discrimination. A
primary goal of our empirical analysis is to investigate the dependence of tuition on ability
and income, and to examine how this varies along the quality hierarchy of schools.
Proposition 1 indicates that endowments rise along the quality hierarchy. Under our
assumptions, we have also shown that (\non-custodial") per student expenditures rise along
the hierarchy as well (Epple et al., 1999). Because the partition of students into schools is
fairly complicated and because we have placed almost no restrictions on f(b;y), we cannot
show generally that the peer measure must ascend along the hierarchy. In some special
cases the latter can be shown.14, and we have found such ascension in related computational
analysis. Given income and ability stratication (Proposition 2), and a positive correlation
between b and y in the population, it is clear that an exception to ascension of the j's
would be pathological. Hence we take the model to predict:
P4 R1 < R2::: < RJ; I1 < I2::: < IJ and 1 < 2::: < J
As we have discussed, tuition discrimination with respect to income will be quite limited if
schools have close substitutes in the quality hierarchy with the exception of the top school.
In other than the top school, tuition will then be close to eective marginal cost. The
average of eective marginal cost in a school equals the marginal resource cost (V 0 + I),
implying average tuition,  pj, will approximate the same. Conditional on intense competition
13See Carlton et al. (1995), Netz (1998), and Hoxby (1997).
14A trivial case, for example, assumes perfect positive correlation of b and y in the population.
16for students, we then expect:
P5  p1 <  p2::: <  pJ;
2.4 Extensions
2.4.1 Diversity
Schools and households may value diversity of their peer group along racial or other di-
mensions. Here we show how the model can be extended to accommodate such preferences,
using race as the example. Students are members of one of N races. Schools observe race
and can condition their admission and tuition policies on race.15 Let  r
j denote the propor-
tion of race r, r 2 f1;2;:::;Ng, in school j, and  r
pop denote the proportion of race r in the







> (=)0 for  r
j < () r
pop (18)
Hence, we characterize diversity as placing value on increasing the attendance of under-
represented races.
We have shown that the admission policy is race dependent for under-represented races,
given by (11) but with admission function () dependent on r and with eective marginal
15Such practices have, of course, recently come under constitutional challenge.
17cost given by:16
EMCr
j = V 0(kj) + Ij +
@qj=@
@qj=@I






Eective marginal cost is now augmented by the last term which equals the cost saving from
increasing school quality by admitting a student from an under-represented race. Because
this term with sign is negative for under-represented races, their eective marginal cost is
lower.
To the extent that schools compete for students so that tuitions are bid down to eective
marginal cost, within school tuitions of students of the same ability are predicted to be lower
for under-represented races. Even for a monopoly provider of schooling, for given ability,
the minimum tuition paid by race is predicted to be lower for under-represented races.
Schools will admit lower-income types that have lower reservation prices if members of
under-represented races.
2.4.2 Non-institutional Financial Aid
Substantial nancial aid to many undergraduates in the form of grants, loans, and work-
study funding is provided by the federal government and to a lesser extent by other entities
that are independent of the student's school. We refer to such aid as non-institutional
aid and brie
y discuss here how such aid aects our model. Much of this aid is based
on the federal government's calculation of expected family contribution, denoted EFC(y),
16Details are available on request.
18which is an increasing function of household income (actually wealth). Let G(y) denote
non-institutional grants which are generally need based and hence written as a function of
income. We presume that the amount of non-institutional aid to the student at school j,
denote Dj, is given by:
Dj =
8
> > > <
> > > :
G(y) if pj   G  EFC(y)
G(y) + 
[pj   G(y)   EFC(y)] if pj   G  EFC(y)
(20)
for some 
 2 [0;1). Our specication presumes that aid in the form of subsidized loans
and/or work study support is given to cover any gap between tuition and grant plus EFC,
which is then discounted by 
 < 1. Note that Dj = 0 for any student for whom G(y) = 0
and pj  EFC(y), which will include all \rich' students.
Continuing to dene pr
j as in (5), i.e. not entering non-institutional aid in the left-hand




The intuition is that schools will continue to take away any surplus the students obtain
from attending their school if tuition is below the price cap. Note, however, that pr
j will
be lower for students that have access to non-institutional aid if a competing school were
attended, since they will continue to have such access at EMC but with the aid.17 Using
17These income eects will aect the equilibrium allocation. The fundamental properties of the allocation
will be unaected, but this is not to suggest insignicant quantitative consequences, especially for poorer
students.
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> > > :
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EFC if pj   G  EFC(y)
(22)
At the same time, pj must equal EMCj along the boundary loci, and pj cannot much deviate
from EMCj if there is intense competition among schools. Loosely, with intense competition,
the consequences of non-institutional aid are predicted to aect mainly the allocation, but
not tuitions. Alternatively, if schools have substantial market power, non-institutional aid
is predicted to be re
ected mainly in higher tuitions (and school expenditures). These
ndings provide additional scope for testing the intensity of competition.
3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics
In the empirical analysis, we use both university-level data and data for a representative
sample of students. Our primary data source is the National Postsecondary Student Aid
Study (NPSAS) obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The
NPSAS contains extensive information for a sample of students. Of particular relevance
for our work, the NPSAS contains the student's performance on standardized tests (either
SAT or ACT), information about income of the student's family, and information about
the nancial aid received by the student. We have secured from the NCES a restricted-use
version of the NPSAS that contains student-level data for 1995-96 and links each student
in the sample to the school the student attended in academic year 1995-96.
20We study four-year colleges and universities. For a given wave of the NPSAS survey, the
NCES chooses a set of colleges and universities. It then selects a sample of students from
within each of those institutions. For the most recent survey, the NCES chose 497 colleges
and universities. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the main variables of the 1995-96
NPSAS used in this paper. The NPSAS sample consists of 11489 students attending 4 year
colleges and universities. We have two measures of ability in this sample. The rst one
is based on SAT and ACT test scores and hence measures ability relative to the pool of
applicants. The students in our sample have SAT scores (or imputed SAT scores) ranging
from 400 to 1540 with a mean SAT score of 929. We also observe the GPA in the rst
semester of college which measures ability relative to the pool of students in a given college.
The mean GPA in our sample is 2.70 with a standard deviation of 0.81.
Most of our analysis focuses on investigating whether students with higher ability levels
pay lower tuitions in equilibrium because of the positive externality they have on other
students through the peer group eect. Tuitions are directly related to the amount of
nancial aid received by a student. Financial aid is measured by the institutional grant
amount. Hence it only includes aid received from the institution which is being attended.
Later we factor non-institutional aid into the empirical analysis. The grant amount received
by an individual in the sample ranges from 0 to 26278 with a mean of $2108 and a standard
deviation of $3675. Approximately 75 % (25%) of the students in our sample receive a grant
from the private (public) institution they attend.
The NPSAS also contains data about the nancial position of the student's family. Mean
family income is $46089 in the sample with a standard deviation of $35,689. Furthermore,
21the NPSAS collects demographic information which is useful for our analysis. More than 75
percent of the students in the sample attend colleges within the state in which the family
resides. The composition by race of our sample is as follows: 12.1 percent classify themselves
as black, 6.9 as Hispanic, 6.5 as Asian and 1.2 percent as other nonwhite race.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: NPSAS Sample
Variable mean std. deviation min max
Grant Amount 2108 3675 0 26278
SAT Score 929 207 400 1540
First year GPA 2.70 .819 0 4
Family Income 46089 35689 0 417388
Same state .758 .427 0 1
Black .121 .327 0 1
Black-private .045 .209 0 1
Hispanic .069 .253 0 1
Hispanic-private .030 .170 0 1
Asian .065 .248 0 1
Asian-private .029 .170 0 1
Other race .012 .113 0 1
Other race- private .004 .067 0 1
In addition to data for individual students, we use data for colleges and universities.
Peterson's conducts a survey of all colleges and universities, obtaining information on faculty
resources, nancial aid, the distribution of standardized test scores, and a host of other
variables. We have purchased their database. We have supplemented this with information
22on educational expenditures and endowments from the NSF Web accessible Computer-Aided
Science Policy Analysis and Research (WebCASPAR) database.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Peterson's Sample
Variable q90 q75 median q25 q10
Mean SAT Score 1174 1100 1030 950 860
Gross Tuition 16300 12480 8990 3535 2337
Net Tuition 11763 9632 6901 3080 1911
Endowment 56488 16046 4916 685 22
Expenditures 9956 6637 4323 3267 2527
Salaries 58993 49256 42429 36345 31653
Enrollment 10474 5042 1957 1087 665
One of the most important variables in our analysis is the average standardized (ACT
or SAT) test score, which provides a good measure for the quality of the peer group of each
college. For the vast majority of colleges in the sample, Peterson's reports the empirical
distributions of verbal and quantitative SAT scores. Alternatively, Peterson's reports the
distribution of the ACT composite score which can be converted into the distribution of
the composite SAT score using standard conversion tables. For these colleges, we can easily
compute the average test score and the standard deviation of scores within the college. If
the distributions of neither SAT nor ACT scores are available in Peterson's database, we try
to approximate the mean SAT scores based on information available in a number of other
publications. While the imputations of the SAT scores for these colleges are admittingly
less precise for these colleges, it is still a useful exercise. It increases the sample size, and,
23more importantly, adds more colleges in the lower tiers to our sample which helps alleviate
potential self-selection problems.
Constructing the remaining variables is a straightforward exercise based on the infor-
mation in our sample. Gross tuition in Table 2 is the weighted average between full-time
tuition for in-state students and full-time tuition for out-of-state students. Net tuition is
gross tuition minus the average amount of need based and non-need based scholarships.
Enrollment is measured by total undergraduate enrollment. All these variables are taken
from Peterson's. Total educational expenditures and endowments are taken from the NSF
WebCaspar database and converted to a per-capita basis using the enrollment variable from
Peterson's. Average faculty salary is reported by Caspar. A public college indicator is also
taken from Peterson's.
Peterson's database contains a total number of 1868 four year colleges and universities
within the United States. We eliminate colleges from our sample which are highly special-
ized, do not have a regular accreditation and have missing values for the most interesting
variables that our analysis focuses on. This leaves us with a sample of 1241 universities and
colleges. Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of the main variables in the sample.
We nd that the median composite SAT score is 1030, the 90 percentile is 1174 and the 10
percentile is 860. Colleges also dier signicantly in undergraduate enrollment ranging from
66 to 35475 with a median enrollment level of 1957. Roughly one third of the colleges in our
sample are public universities, with the remaining two thirds private. Gross annual tuition
ranges from $230 dollars to $22000. The median gross tuition is about $8990. Financial aid
24is quite signicant. Median net tuition is $6901, almost $2100 less than gross tuition. Note
that net tuition per student is greater than expenditure per student in all but the lowest
quantile reported in Table 2. The expenditure measure we use is instructional expenditures
reported in the NSF WebCaspar database. Thus, costs of administration and custodial
services are not included in this measure of educational expenditures. Median endowment
per undergraduate is approximately $4916. However the distribution of endowment is quite
skewed, with a small number of colleges having very large endowments, and the majority
of colleges having only small endowments. The 99 percentile is $423,077, the 75 percent
quantile is only $16,047 and the 25 percent quantile is $686.
There is also a large amount of variation in educational expenditures per student. Un-
fortunately, the expenditure variable includes components which have nothing to do with
undergraduate education. For example, colleges with large medical colleges have much
higher expenditures per capita than comparable colleges. The colleges in the top 2 or 3
percent in our sample have expenditure levels which are dominated by expenditures which
are unrelated to educational expenditures. For example the 99 percentile is $51,388. For
the remaining sample, expenditure per capita are more informative about educational ex-
penditures. For example, the 95 percent quantile is $13,731, the 75 percent quantile is
$6,637, the median is $4,323 and the 25 percent quantile is $3,267. Another measure which
captures dierent expenditures is average faculty salary. This variable does not have the
drawbacks associated with the expenditure variable. Median average salary is $42,429. The
75 percent quantile is $49,256 and the 25 percent quantile is $36,345. The college with the
highest salaries in our sample is Cal Tech with an average salary of $112,401.
25Table 3: Correlation Matrix
Mean Gross Net
SAT Tuition Tuition Endowment Expenditure Salary Public Enrollment
Mean SAT Score 1.00
Gross Tuition 0.50 1.00
Net Tuition 0.41 0.93 1.00
Endowment 0.34 0.27 0.25 1.00
Expenditure 0.28 0.22 0.23 0.80 1.00
Salary 0.52 0.20 0.16 0.30 0.32 1.00
Public -0.18 -0.76 -0.74 -0.14 -0.08 0.25 1.00
Enrollment 0.10 -0.40 -0.38 -0.06 0.00 0.49 0.60 1.00
26Finally, we report the correlation structure between tuition rates, mean SAT scores,
endowments, expenditures, and some other measures in Table 3. Not surprisingly, we nd
that mean SAT scores are strongly positively correlated with tuition, endowment, expen-
ditures and faculty salary. Also endowment is positively correlated with both expenditures
and salaries. The correlation table also suggests that public universities are typically larger
and have lower tuition and expenditure levels than private universities.
4 Evidence Regarding Hierarchy and Stratication
4.1 Evidence Regarding Hierarchy Predictions
The theoretical model implies a hierarchy in which university endowment and college quality
have the same ordering. For most parameter sets the model will further imply that mean
student ability and input per student will be similarly ordered. Investigation of predictions
about ordering of variables across colleges provides a natural rst test of the model. Of
course the ordering predictions will not be satised perfectly by the data.
Before we can analyze whether our data provide some evidence in favor of the hierarchical
predictions of the underlying equilibrium model, we need to dene the appropriate choice
set faced by individual households. A natural starting point of the analysis is to treat each
college as a dierentiated product. The relevant choice set is then the total number of
colleges in our sample which is 1241. While this approach is appealing, it has some obvious
limitations which arise to due the large number of potential choices. One of the main
drawbacks of this approach relates to the fact that we need to observe the complete choice
27set faced by the individuals in order to test the predictions of our model. The NPSAS,
however, does not sample all colleges in the population, but only a representative sample
of colleges. For example, the most recent NPSAS sample only contains students of 497
colleges of the 1241 colleges in the Peterson's sample.
Furthermore, we do not expect that the strong predictions of our underlying equilibrium
model hold at the college level. There are likely to be many idiosyncratic factors which in
u-
ence college choice and which are omitted from our theoretical model. However, we expect
that the model will be more successful in explaining patterns of choice, and admission and
pricing behavior on a more aggregate level. The basic idea is that most of the idiosyncrasies
are irrelevant on the aggregate level. For example, our model is better suited to explain
whether a student with given income and ability attends a top private college or mediocre
private college than whether a student attends Yale or Stanford. By aggregating colleges
with similar observed characteristics, we thus abstract from a number of factors such as
regional preferences which are important at a disaggregate level, but are likely to be less
important in a suitably aggregated model.
Finding appropriate algorithms for aggregating colleges with similar characteristics and
dening an appropriate choice set faced by the individuals is a challenging task. Aggregation
should be based on the principle of substitutability. Public colleges may behave dierently
than private colleges for a number of reasons from which we have largely abstracted in
our theoretical model. Public colleges may have somewhat dierent objective functions
and face dierent nancial constraints than private colleges. Then public colleges may use
dierent pricing and admission policies than their private counterparts. We should therefore
28dierentiate in our empirical analysis between private and public colleges.
Our model also suggests that colleges which are close substitutes should have similar
pricing and admission policies as well as expenditure choice. Similarly, our model sug-
gests that these dierences are largely determined by dierences in nancial endowments.
Colleges with similar levels of endowment per student are, therefore, likely to be close
substitutes.
Table 4: Means by Diculty Level: Private Colleges
observations mean sat net tuition endowment expenditure
I 33 1350 14474 43820 5729
II 98 1208 11688 7996 1171
III 569 1035 8641 1625 570
IV 100 902 7203 987 475
V 27 890 4821 628 323
We address this aggregation problem using two approaches. The rst approach draws on
classication schemes which are frequently used in practice. For example, Peterson's clas-
sies colleges based on their selectivity in admitting new students. Peterson's distinguishes
between ve types of colleges. Diculty level I includes colleges such that more than 75
percent of the freshmen were in in top 10 percent of their high school class, scored more
than 1250 on the SAT or 29 on the ACT, and admitted fewer than 30 percent of applicants.
Diculty level II includes colleges such that more than 50 percent freshmen were in the top
10 percent of their high school class, scored more than 1150 on the SAT or 26 on the ACT,
29and admitted fewer than 60 percent of applicants. Diculty level III includes colleges in
which more than 75 percent of the freshmen were in the top half of their high school and
scored over 950 on the SAT or 18 on the ACT, and admitted fewer than 85 percent of all
applicants. Diculty level IV contains colleges with minimal admission standards, while
colleges in diculty level V have virtually no admission standards.
Table 4 reports the means of the most important variables by diculty level for the
sample of private colleges. We nd that all four quality related variables are monotonic
functions of the degree of diculty. More selective colleges have higher endowments and
expenditures than less selective colleges as predicted by our equilibrium model.
Table 5: Means by Diculty Level: Public Colleges
observations mean sat net tuition endowment expenditure
II 30 1168 3699 1414 866
III 278 1017 2675 199 501
IV 65 865 2142 42 347
V 41 913 2258 86 328
We repeat this exercise for the set of public colleges and the results are shown in Table
5.18 We nd that public colleges show similar patterns to private colleges. The main
dierence is that there does not seem to be an obvious dierences between type IV and
type V colleges. We conclude that, at least for a very coarse aggregation rule, the most
interesting variables in the sample { mean SAT score, tuition, endowment and expenditures
18There are no diculty level I public schools.
30{ satisfy the hierarchical predictions of the underlying equilibrium model.
Peterson's classication scheme is still very coarse. The largest groups still contains
more than 550 colleges. It is not reasonable to assume that the colleges within each type
are homogeneous with respect to their admission and pricing policies. We can rene our
classication scheme and construct a ner grid of colleges using cluster analysis. The basic
idea behind K-means cluster analysis is to nd a clustering or grouping of the observations
so as to minimize the total within-cluster sum of squares.
We perform a cluster analysis for the sample of private colleges using mean SAT scores,
net tuition and endowment as the three main variables used to dene the clusters. We
implement the analysis using the standardized variables and assigning equal weights to
each of the three variables. We perform the cluster analysis for a number of dierent
choices of the number of clusters. Table 6 reports the cluster means for an analysis with
25 groups. We rank clusters by the mean SAT score. We nd that the correlation between
mean sat scores and mean net tuition across the sample of 25 groups is 0.6. The correlation
between mean SAT and mean endowment (expenditures) is 0.47 (0.40) which is somewhat
lower largely due to a couple of outliers.
We repeat this exercise using the sample of public colleges. The only dierence is that
we only use mean SAT scores and net tuition as variables in the analysis since endowments
are less important for public colleges. Table 7 reports our ndings based on an analysis of
15 clusters.
31Table 6: Clustering Analysis: Private Colleges
observations mean sat net tuition endowment expenditure
1 14 655.29 4707.85 410 254
2 18 782.11 9414.07 365 424
3 20 826.65 5237.70 1363 515
4 40 858.42 8052.52 693 460
5 25 902.64 11235.94 765 656
6 37 951.11 6561.54 1070 380
7 47 954.02 9556.43 697 603
8 24 968.75 2669.77 1288 337
9 47 975.22 8172.79 767 465
10 44 1016.05 5013.22 778 340
11 56 1023.82 10883.50 1140 535
12 50 1043.80 6754.57 1407 401
13 17 1056.59 13931.01 2218 824
14 90 1061.31 8927.41 1035 448
15 44 1118.05 7077.73 2008 439
16 60 1134.28 11531.91 2764 756
17 21 1139.48 4396.60 2706 470
18 52 1139.81 9601.22 3799 839
19 23 1187.35 15424.00 4656 1005
20 26 1191.48 7327.28 7237 1195
21 3 1277.90 12259.16 215547 27978
22 31 1278.63 11813.95 10777 2017
23 10 1318.55 11890.36 42099 2966
24 23 1323.63 15854.73 13714 2341
25 5 1442.27 14467.85 77885 6949
32Table 7: Clustering Analysis: Public Colleges
observations mean sat net tuition endowment expenditure
1 12 661.58 2336.22 27 334
2 15 824.47 1349.56 86 396
3 29 830.34 2682.54 75 385
4 17 922.29 840.56 62 412
5 43 928.98 1882.35 35 333
6 47 954.70 3102.30 62 404
7 14 954.93 5077.31 88 436
8 35 1005.09 1394.25 135 399
9 51 1017.32 2209.04 107 429
10 10 1032.30 302.89 222 531
11 46 1053.24 3813.50 279 569
12 43 1077.85 2740.08 305 581
13 15 1152.33 1477.06 1573 751
14 11 1177.77 6550.98 1442 964
15 26 1188.77 3716.69 609 760
334.2 Evidence Regarding Stratication
The theoretical model predicts that we should observe a certain amount of stratication in
income and ability among universities. One way to measure the amount of ability stratica-
tion is to decompose the variance of ability in the set of universities into within-universities
and between-universities components. A simple calculation shows that the following de-







Pr(Cj) [E(bj)   E(b)]2 (23)
where Pr(Cj) is the proportion of sampled students in school j. Dividing both sides of the
equation by Var(b) yields the decomposition of the variance measured in percent. If there is
perfect stratication by ability, the rst component will be small. Alternatively, if preference
heterogeneity were large, the rst component would be large. Hence, the magnitude of the
rst and the second components helps us evaluate the importance of ability stratication
in the sample.
Table 8: Stratication of Test Scores
sample size within college variance across college variance
ACT score 846 62.3 % 37.7 %
quantitative SAT score 710 60.6 % 39.4 %
verbal SAT score 712 58.3 % 41.7 %
We compute the variance decomposition for the colleges in the sample for which we have
34data on the distribution of the verbal SAT score, the quantitative SAT score or the ACT
score. The results of these computations are shown in Table 8. We nd that the second
component of the variance is fairly large for all three measures of ability. This indicates
that there is a large amount of stratication across schools as predicted by our equilibrium
model.
Our model implies that in the (y;b) plane, the student population will be partitioned
into schools by boundary loci as illustrated in Figure 1. If the kind of stratication depicted
in Figure 1 is present, then the correlation of income and ability within schools will be less
than the correlation of income and ability in the overall student population. Testing this
prediction, we nd that the correlation of income and ability in the student population
is .263. By contrast, the partial correlation of income and ability when controlling for
school xed eects is .128. Thus, the within-school correlation is half the correlation in the
overall student population. These correlations are based on a sample of 9,024 students, so
the dierence in the estimated correlations is highly signicant. Thus, the prediction of
stratication is also supported by these correlations.
5 Evidence Regarding Pricing and Financial Aid
The equilibrium model discussed in Section 2 has a variety of predictions regarding pricing
policies that can be tested without estimating the structural parameters of the model. If
colleges have close substitutes, then price approximately equals eective marginal cost for all
students. Equation (12) then approximately characterizes net tuition paid by all students.
35We assume that price is measured with an additive error and ability is measured without
error. For student s with ability b in school i, equation (12) and the assumption that schools
have close substitutes imply:
pis = 0;i + 1;i bs + is (24)
The 's in this equation are school-specic intercepts and school-specic slope coecients
on student ability (b), and is is the error in measuring tuition net of nancial aid. The
model and the assumption that schools with close substitutes also implies absence of income
as a variable in equation (24). This can be tested by adding income terms in the above
equation.
pis = 0;i + 1;i bs + 2;i ys + is (25)
We anticipate that pricing by income will be found in the top-ranked schools who face no
competition from above.
So far in this section we have ignored the existence of price caps. We observe that a
large fraction of students do not receive nancial aid and hence must pay the regular tuition
rate that the university charges. It is convenient to focus directly on the nancial received
by the students. Let pm
i be the posted tuition in school i, and let gis be the measured grant
received by student s in school i. Then the price paid by student i in school s can be written
36as
pis = pm
i   gis (26)
Posted tuition is the same for all students in a school and is thus impounded in the xed
eect in (25). Using grants as the dependent variable reverses the signs of the coecients
in (25). Thus, our competitive model predicts 1i > 0 and 2i = 0. From an econometric
perspective, the price caps give rise to censoring. Consequently, we estimate the above
equation using a Tobit procedure.
Equations (24) and (25) can in principle be estimated separately for each school, pro-
vided one has a sucient number of observations for each school in the sample. Unfortu-
nately sample sizes for individual colleges are small in the NPSAS. Therefore, we need to
impose more structure on the underlying regression function. To simplify the analysis, we





where mi is the median SAT score in school i among the students in the sample who attend
school i, h is the highest value of mi in the sample, and l is the lowest. Thus, for the highest
ranked school, ri takes on a value of zero, and for the lowest ranked school, ri takes on a
value of 1. We then assume that college specic intercepts of ability and income satisfy the
37following assumption:
1;i = 11 + 1;2 ri + 1;3 di (28)
2;i = 21 + 2;2 ri + 1;3 di
where di is a dummy indicating whether the college is private or public. Substituting
equation (28) into equation (25) and focusing on nancial aid yields our preferred model
and which can be expressed (with a slight abuse of notation) as follows:
gis = 0;i + 11 bs + 12 ri bs + 13 di bs
+ 21 ys + 22 riys + 23 diys + is (29)
Motivated by our analysis of diversity in Section 2.4, we also include indicator variables
for African American, Hispanic, Asian, and other non-white in our Tobit model. We also
include an indicator variable for whether a student lived within the state where the college
is located. State schools generally have a higher posted tuition for out-of-state students,
and our aid measure is relative to the particular student's posted tuition. Nevertheless,
schools may perceive out-of-state applicants as more mobile, hence participating in a more
competitive market, and this motivates inclusion of this dummy variable.19 The results of
our estimation are reported in Table 9.20
To interpret Table 9, recall that RANK equals 0 for the top ranked school and 1 for the
19Another possibility is that geographic diversity in student body is an element of school \quality."
20We have also estimated the model with athletic scholarships removed from institutional grants. Results
are very similar.
38Table 9: Tobit: Financial Aid Amounts
Coecient Standard Error t-value
SAT -1.68 1.23 -1.359
SAT  private 2.08 0.69 3.015
SAT  rank 11.09 2.40 4.618
GPA 821.32 303.09 2.710
GPA  private -130.10 167.19 -0.778
GPA  rank 310.17 580.93 0.534
Income -.0949 .0057 -16.600
Income  private -.0021 .0035 -0.589
Income  rank .1577 .0110 14.234
Same state -2346.29 230.69 -10.171
Same state  private 1520.04 274.74 5.532
Black 1760.17 286.45 6.145
Black  private 293.97 418.69 0.702
Hispanic 1792.75 330.45 5.425
Hispanic  private -771.32 446.35 -1.728
Asian 746.43 336.67 2.217
Asian  private -1349.67 431.44 -3.128
Other race 500.74 641.50 0.781
Other race  private -1522.62 945.80 -1.610
N = 8497. 
2(424) = 7424:57. Prob > 
2 = 0:00. Log Likelihood = -41587.706.
39lowest ranked school, and PRIVATE equals 0 for public schools and 1 for private schools.
In the discussion that follows, we will interpret the results for private schools. The ndings
are not markedly dierent for public schools, and the dierences are easily seen by scanning
the results in Table 9.
The estimates in Table 9 imply that the top-ranked schools give negligible discounts to
more able students. For the top-ranked school, the coecient on SAT is only .4 (=2.08-1.68)
and not signicantly dierent from zero (p=.71). For the lowest-ranked private school, the
coecient on SAT is 11.49 and highly signicant, implying an $11.49 increase in nancial
aid for each unit increase in SAT. We include rst-semester GPA as another measure of
ability, in an eort to measure elements of \ability," like motivation, that may exhibit little
correlation with SAT.21 The coecient of the GPA variable indicates that private schools
give discounts of roughly $690 per unit increase in GPA, and this is statistically signicant
(p=.01). This discount is estimated to increase somewhat as school rank declines, though
the coecient (310.17) is not signicantly dierent from zero. A plausible generalization of
our specication of the combined utility-achievement function (recall (3)) may explain the
relatively limited discounting to ability we nd at top schools. Our Cobb-Douglas speci-
cation has the property that for xed alternative school and tuition there, the marginal
willingness to pay for quality elsewhere is independent of ability. Our model predicts dis-
counting to ability because peer ability is valued, implying higher-ability students have
more attractive alternatives. Suppose instead that for xed alternative (including tuition),
21It is interesting to note that rst-semester GPA and SAT have a correlation of .4 in the NCES data. Thus,
there are clearly factors other than SAT that play an important role in determining academic performance.
40the marginal willingness to pay for quality elsewhere rises with ability as, for example, a
CES specication of the combined utility-achievement function allows. This would reinforce
ability discounting in equilibrium among students whose best alternative is a lower-quality
school, and reduce or reverse ability discounting among students whose best alternative is
a higher-quality school (without changing the qualitative pattern of preferences and the
allocation from that in Figures 1-2). Because the top schools face no competition \from
above," the latter predictions are quite consistent with the observed pattern of pricing by
ability. Another possibility that might explain the lack of observed discounting to ability
at top schools is omitted variable bias as further discussed below.
The coecients on income imply that the top-ranked private school reduces grant aid by
$96 for each $1,000 increase in household income. This premium declines with rank as the
interaction with rank and income indicates. Taken literally, the results would imply that
there is actually a discount to the highest income households in the lowest quality schools.
However, this is largely an artifact of the functional form. We will see in Table 10 that the
tuition does not vary signicantly with income at the lowest ranked schools.
The same-state variable equals 1 if the student is from the state in which the school is
located and zero otherwise. The negative coecient of this variable may be an indication
that schools price discriminate to some degree against students located nearby. If schools
have some geographically based market power, this would not be an implausible outcome as
discussed above. However, we know that some schools, particularly public schools, charge
lower tuition to in-state residents. Thus, the negative coecient on the same-state variable
might be picking up a tendency of schools to give lower grants to students who are already
41receiving a tuition discount. In results not shown in Table 9, we added the within-state
discount to the dependent variable. We then found that the coecient of the same-state
variable was reduced to roughly half the value in Table 9, and there was then no signicant
dierence in the same-state variable between the public and private schools. Thus, the
evidence suggests some degree of price discrimination against nearby residents.22
The coecients on race are largely self-explanatory and consistent with our theoretical
predictions about the value of diversity. African American and Hispanic students receive
signicant tuition discounts and are under-represented in colleges relative to their popula-
tion shares, especially in private colleges. The results for Asian students are aected by
dierential pricing to in-state residents. When discounts to in-state residents are added to
the dependent variable, the results suggest that Asian students do not receive signicant
nancial aid in either public or private schools. In addition, the results then indicate that
both African American and Hispanic students receive signicantly greater nancial aid in
private than in public schools.
We have estimated Tobits similar to those in Table 9 using rankings based on our
cluster analysis in place of the SAT ranking variable used in Table 9. The results are not
qualitatively dierent when the alternative ranking variables are used.
As an alternative to the ranking variable in (27), we also interacted the SAT and income
measures with the Peterson's selectivity measures. As we discussed in the previous section,
Peterson's selectivity measures are based on a combination of criteria that includes percent
22We noted above the possibility too that schools value geographic diversity in their student body.
42Table 10: Tobit: Financial Aid Amounts and Selectivity
Coecient Standard Error t-value
Sat sel1 -6.560723 1.690119 -3.882
Sat sel2 4.689578 .7299503 6.425
Sat sel3 6.1664 .395808 15.579
Sat sel4 7.435139 1.189917 6.248
Sat sel5 8.398905 1.917852 4.379
Income sel1 -.0920505 .0059214 -15.545
Income sel2 -.0570317 .003355 -16.999
Income sel3 -.0244991 .0020838 -11.757
Income sel4 .0074151 .0072152 1.028
Income sel5 -.0146154 .0182821 -0.799
N = 8548. 2(424) = 7341:4. Prob > 
2 = 0:00. Log Likelihood = -42268.338.
of freshmen in top 10 percent of their high school class, composite SAT (or ACT score), and
percent of applicants accepted. The result is shown in Table 10. This Tobit also includes
the same state and race variables and interactions with private as appear in Table 9, but,
in the interest of space, we do not report coecients of those variables. School xed eects
are also included in the Tobit in Table 10, as in Table 9. Our ndings suggest that the
amount of pricing by income is lower for lower ranked schools (and not signicant for the
bottom two selectivity groups). The results also show that lower ranked schools also give
more to more able students. The coecient on SAT is actually negative for the highest
ranked schools, which may be due to omitted variables.
In estimating the pricing equation, we have not taken account of selection eects. We
43envision doing this in future structural estimation of the model. We believe that selection
eects, if present, will bias the coecients of SAT and income estimated in this paper
toward zero. To see why, suppose that, in addition to SAT scores, schools use measures of
ability that we do not observe. They will use such measures if, in the applicant population,
such measures have value in predicting ability beyond that provided by SAT scores. Such
measures may be correlated with SAT, but only components of such measures that are
orthogonal to SAT provide predictive power beyond that provided by SAT. Hence, suppose
schools have access to measures of ability that, in the applicant population, are orthogonal
to SAT.
A school i might admit a student with relatively low SAT scores if the other measures
of ability for the student were more favorable. A student with relatively high SAT scores
might attend i because other measures of the student's ability were suciently low that
schools ranked higher than school i did not admit the student. This problem is also likely
to be worse in the top ranked schools where there is less variation in SAT. Thus, within
a school, the component of ability that schools observe and we do not observe will tend
to be negatively correlated with SAT. This implies that the coecient of measured ability
(SAT) will be biased toward zero. We have actually used rst-semester GPA in addition
to SAT as ability measures in our pricing equations, but the same logic applies if schools
use predictors of ability that are orthogonal to both SAT and rst-semester GPA. Thus, if
selection eects are present, the extent of pricing by ability is greater than we estimate in
this paper. The same logic also applies to income; if selection eects are present, the extent
of pricing by income is greater than we have estimated in this paper.
44Our empirical analysis of non-institutional aid suggests a need for more study, and
we just summarize our ndings here. Based on the theoretical analysis above and using
(2.22), we included total federal grants (G) as a covariate in our basic Tobit specication,
and also interacted it with the private dummy variable and our SAT school-rank measure.
We also created a dummy variable equal to 1 (0) if pj   G   EFC > () 0 that was
interacted with EFC, income, and, again, the private dummy variable and rank measure.
The latter was to test for the potential eects in the lower line of (2.22) of non-institutional
aid beyond grants (like subsidized loans) provided to cover the ability-to-pay gap perceived
by the federal government. Total federal grants and EFC are in the NPSAS data base.
As discussed above, the non-institutional aid variables should have no direct eects if the
environment is highly competitive as tuitions are bid down to eective marginal cost.23 If
substantial market power is present, then schools capture non-institutional aid according
to the theory, and the coecients should have the opposite signs of those in (2.22) since
we use institutional aid, rather than tuition, as the dependent variable. Generally, G had
no signicant eects which is consistent with a competitive environment throughout the
ranks of schools. At lowly ranked schools, neither did the EFC-related variables dier
substantially from zero. However, at highly ranked schools, the EFC-related variables were
signicant but with the reverse signs of those predicted by the market-power model! At this
point we can only speculate about the meaning of these unexpected results.24 We take these
23The eects of federal aid are then essentially income eects that impact the allocation of students into
schools but not the fundamentals of pricing.
24For example, our nding that institutional aid declines at highly ranked schools as EFC rises in the
range where pj   G   EFC > 0 may be due to omitted variables. The federal government's calculation of
EFC may take account of important wealth variables not in our household income measure.
45results to indicate a need for more theoretical and empirical investigation of the interaction
of institutional and non-institutional aid.
6 Conclusions
Our empirical results provide support for several aspects of our model. They also raise
interesting puzzles for future research. We nd evidence that there is a hierarchy of school
qualities, as our model predicts. We also nd correlation of SAT scores, endowment per
student, and expenditure per student across the hierarchy as our model predicts.
We see the evidence on pricing as supportive of the view that the more highly ranked
schools exercise some degree of market power. This is re
ected in the substantial variation
of price with income coupled with discounts to more able students that are modest at best.
Lower ranked schools exhibit behavior that is closer to the predictions of the competitive
model. They charge lower tuitions to more able students while charging much lower premi-
ums to income than the more highly ranked schools. While the pattern of pricing at middle-
and lower-ranked schools accords reasonably well with the predictions of the competitive
model, the extent of pricing by income at middle-ranked schools remains something of a
puzzle and an interesting stimulus for further research.
The evidence on pricing by ability is supportive of positive peer eects in educational
achievement from high ability at the college level. An alternative hypothesis is that there
are no peer eects but colleges value higher-ability students since they increase prestige,
signal educational quality, and so on. This environment would also lead to discounting
46to ability so long as schools have market power. However, to the extent schools compete
for students, tuitions will be bid down to marginal educational cost, here independent of
student ability.25 We nd that as we move down the hierarchy of schools, the evidence
on pricing by income indicates little market power, while there is much stronger evidence
of discounting to ability. Hence, our ndings support the existence of ability driven peer
eects in higher education.
The evidence of pricing by ability is supportive of the prediction that schools value the
improved peer quality that results from attraction of more able students. Thus, the evidence
is consistent with the presence of peer group eects. The evidence does not, however,
establish the presence of peer eects. Similar pricing would be predicted in a model where
households obtain utility from having their students at schools with a more able peer group
even if that more able peer group does not convey any increase in educational benets.
Nonetheless, our evidence is encouraging for further work on peer eects in education. Had
there not been evidence of pricing by ability, support for the hypothesis that peers convey
educational benets would have been considerably weakened.
25One might also believe that a unit of educational quality costs less to provide to higher-ability students.
This would require that the same educational inputs are cheaper when students are better (since the model
already has higher-ability students achieve more highly for given inputs). Cursory examination of the
evidence on teacher salaries is not supportive of this in higher education, though, obviously, this may be
confounded by variation in teacher quality. But we also nd in the data that a signicant proportion of
students get a free ride. It is implausible that the resource educational cost of students is negative, so we
are lead back to peer eects.
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This gure illustrates the boundaries of schools' admission sets.






































This gure illustrates the best alternative choices for students in equi-
librium.
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